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I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent decline in the value of real property collateral securing residential and commercial loans in Montana has spawned
litigation over the procedures used by creditors in foreclosure actions.1 This activity is natural because the law governing the mortgage, deed of trust and land sales contract foreclosures in Montana
is an attempted balance. It seeks to balance the protection the law
affords to a debtor whose personal assets may ultimately be subject
to a deficiency judgment and the restrictions imposed on a foreclosing creditor who must obtain the collateral in partial or total
satisfaction of the defaulted loan.
This article examines restrictions placed on creditors who judicially or non-judicially foreclose a Montana deed of trust or
mortgage. Specifically it examines the judicial construction of
Montana's "One Action Rule" that governs a traditional Montana
real estate mortgage foreclosure. Additionally, the article examines
the interrelationship between Montana's Uniform Commercial
Code and Montana's judicial and non-judicial foreclosure scheme
when a creditor forecloses on personal and real property securing a
single promissory obligation. The article also outlines the various
prohibitions Montana places on deficiency judgments and outlines
the protections Montana affords to the debtor at the foreclosure
sale. It concludes with some suggested legislative reforms.

II.

HISTORY

An understanding of the terminology and principal protections
of Montana's mortgage foreclosure law requires a brief explanation
of the development of modern mortgage law.2 In fourteenth century England, the common law mortgage was an actual conveyance
of fee simple ownership from the borrower to the creditor. If the
borrower paid the loan, title would revest in the borrower.3 The
common law mortgage was harsh; if for any reason the payment
was not made on "law day," the mortgagor forfeited all interest in
4
the mortgaged property.
By the seventeenth century, courts of equity created certain
borrower protections: the borrower was entitled, as a matter of
course and right, to redeem his land from the mortgage if he ten1.

First State Bank v. Chunkapura,

2. G.

NELSON

& D.

-

Mont.

__,

734 P.2d 1203 (1987).

WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §

1.2, at 6 (2nd ed. 1985).

3. Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict
Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 850, 855 (1985).
4. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 856; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 6.
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dered the principal and interest within a reasonable time after law
day.5 Because the borrower-mortgagor's right of "tardy" redemption resulted in a hardship on the mortgagee, equity developed the
mortgagee's right to foreclose the equity of redemption.6 At the request of the mortgagee in a bill setting forth the details of the
mortgage and default, equity would order the mortgagor to pay the
debt, interest, and costs within a fixed period. That failing, a decree would be issued forever barring the mortgagor's equity of
redemption. 7
Because the mortgagee already had legal title to the land, subject only to the mortgagor's right to redeem, the mortgagee became
the absolute owner of the land.8 This kind of foreclosure action left
the mortgagee with clear title to the property and resulted, in effect, with the mortgagee exchanging the debt for the mortgagor's
land." This type of foreclosure is referred to as "strict foreclosure"
because it often resulted in an exchange of land for a disproportionate smaller debt."0
Because of the harshness of strict foreclosure to the borrower,
by the nineteenth century the common law added procedural protections to the foreclosure process.11 These protections included
notice to all parties interested, open decree of court, and publicity
of sale. In theory, they decreased the loss to the borrower and permitted the creditor to recover a deficiency judgment if the sale
price fell short of the debt. 2
Like England under the common law, the United States legal
system also rejected the "strict foreclosure" method."3 In its stead,
the two predominant, contemporary foreclosure methods developed:1 judicial foreclosure by public sale and non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale.' 5 Under the judicial method, a public sale
5. The right was recognized as an estate in land and is known as the "equity of redemption." Wechsler, supra note 3, at 856; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.3 at 7.
6. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 856; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.3 at 8.
7. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 8.
8. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 857; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 8.
9. Id.

10. "Under strict foreclosure the mortgagee might acquire land far more valuable than
the mortgage debt, a result considered harsh, oppressive, and unfair." Wechsler, supra note
3, at 859; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 8.
11. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 857-58.
12. Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 318, 278 P. 1002, 1005 (1929); "Foreclosure by sale was
viewed as a logical way of protecting the debtor's equity in the property while still allowing
the mortgagee to recover a deficiency judgment when the proceeds of the sale fell short of
the amount owed by the mortgagor." Wechsler, supra note 3, at 859.
13. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 858.
14. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.4, at 9.
15. Id.
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results after a full judicial proceeding. All interested persons must
be made parties. 6 Under the power of sale method, no judicial
proceeding is usually required and, after varying types and degrees
of notice to the borrower and other interest holders, a public official, sheriff, or trustee sells the property at public sale.1 7 The foreclosure processes required under the principal real estate security
devices used in Montana are examined below.
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL REAL PROPERTY SECURITY
DEVICES IN MONTANA

The principal real property security devices in Montana are
the contract for deed (or land sales contract), the deed of trust (or
trust indenture), and the mortgage.
A.

Contract for Deed

Under the contract for deed, the record owner of the real
property delivers a warranty deed to the immediately succeeding
purchaser when the purchaser or his successor has completed the
last payment." Pending payment by the purchaser, legal title to
the property remains vested in the seller.' 9 A warranty deed from
the seller to the purchaser typically remains in escrow together
with a quitclaim deed from the purchaser to the seller with instructions for its delivery to the seller for recording in the event of
default."
The terms and provisions (price, down payment, interest rate,
etc.) and collateral protection provisions (insurance requirements,
limitations on releasing of tracts of the collateral) differ according
to the kind of real estate involved. However, the contract usually
contains two mutually exclusive remedies: release of the deeds by
the escrow agent causing a termination of the contract or acceleration of the principal balance together with delivery by the seller of
16. For Montana's judicial foreclosure procedures see infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
17. For Montana's non-judicial foreclosure procedures see infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
, 747 P.2d 1358 (1987)
18. See Aveco Properties, Inc. v. Nicholson, - Mont. and MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-115 (1987).
19. The seller retains legal title whereas the buyer holds equitable title. Greenup v.
United States, 239 F. Supp. 330 (D. Mont. 1965).
20. This non-judicial remedy of termination or forfeiture is not automatic, however,
because the buyer can usually force legal action to enforce the contract by informing the
escrow agent that the buyer has equity in the property causing the escrow agent to interplead the account under MONT. R. Civ. P. 22(b).
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the warranty deed to the buyer." The Montana Supreme Court
does not require a contract for deed to be foreclosed as a mortgage2 and has refused to characterize the contract as a purchase
money mortgage." Thus, if the seller elects specific performance,
sells the property at sheriff's sale to satisfy the accelerated balance,
and incurs a "deficiency, ' " the purchaser is personally liable for
2
the resulting deficiency judgment.
B. Mortgage and Deed of Trust
While in some states title is actually transferred from the
debtor-mortgagor to the creditor-mortgagee,' 6 in Montana a mortgage of real property is a lien from the borrower to the creditor.' 7
As such, Montana falls into the substantial majority of states that
follow the lien theory of mortgages.' 8 Montana also allows for a
deed of trust security device where the borrower-grantor 9 grants
fee title" to a trustees" (usually a title company) to secure repayment of the grantor's obligation to the beneficiary-creditor."
Chapter 1, title 71 of the Montana Code Annotated codifies the
following mortgages: the traditional mortgage," the traditional
mortgage with a power of sale provision," the purchase money
21. This latter option is sometimes referred to as specific performance. Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc., 182 Mont. 389, 597 P.2d 689 (1979).
22. White v. Jewett, 106 Mont. 416, 420, 78 P.2d 85, 87 (1938) (holding that the predecessor to MONT.CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 governing mortgage foreclosures had no application to
a contract for deed terminated by cancellation); See also Aveco, Mont. at -, 747
P.2d at 1361.
23. Aveco, - Mont. at , 747 P.2d at 1360; Glacier Campground, 182 Mont. at
405, 597 P.2d at 698.
24. The accelerated debt and interest, plus certain costs and fees, less the sales price.
25. Aveco, - Mont. at , 747 P.2d at 1360; Glacier Campground, 182 Mont. at
405, 597 P.2d at 698.
26. This is the "title theory" of mortgage law having its roots in the common law,
discussed above. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.5, at 10.
27. "The lien of a mortgage is special, unless otherwise expressly agreed, and is independent of possession." MONT.CODE ANN. § 71-1-103 (1987).
28. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 4.2, at 145.
29. The term "grantor" means "the person conveying real property by a trust indenture as security for the performance of an obligation." MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-303(3)
(1987). It is synonomous with the mortgagor, except a third party trustee holds title for the
benefit of the beneficiary-mortgagee and is the practical equivalent of a mortgage with a
power of sale provision. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 11-12. See also MONT.
CODE ANN. § 71-1-305 (1987).
30. MONT.CODE ANN. § 71-1-303(5) (1987).
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-303(5) 1987.
32. MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-303(1) to -304 (1987).
33. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-101 to -103, 71-1-203 (1987).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-223 (1987).
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mortgage,3 5 and the deed of trust.38
1. TraditionalMortgage
The traditional mortgage foreclosure requires a full judicial
proceeding under the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 Upon
foreclosure, the proceeding eliminates the debtor's equity of redemption" and results in a decree of foreclosure and sale of the
property for partial or total satisfaction of the accelerated debt
plus interest, costs, fees, and other charges. 9 It is governed by
Montana's one action rule, a procedural and substantive protection
that forces the creditor to foreclose all collateral in one "judicial"
action. 0 If foreclosed in compliance with the one action rule, the
debtor can be liable for a deficiency judgment. 41 The creditor can
purchase at the sheriff's sale,"2 and the court need not confirm the
sale price. " For up to one year after the sheriff's sale, the debtor
may redeem the property upon payment of the sale price, plus interest and assessments. 4
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 (1987).
36. A deed of trust, in legal effect and theory, is the practical equivalent of a mortgage
with a power of sale provision. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Bentley, 217
Cal. 644, 20 P.2d 940 (1933).
37. Montana's statutory mortgage foreclosure scheme is one of four "One Action" statutes (Nevada, Utah, and Idaho are the others) patterned after California's statute. NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.2, at 598. Additionally, Montana, like thirty-one other states,
authorizes both the traditional judicial foreclosure scheme and the non-judicial foreclosure
in all or some circumstances. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The
Soundness of Iowa's Traditional Preferencefor ProtectionOver Credit, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5
(1985). In contrast, nine other states require judicial foreclosure as the sole means of foreclosure by statute or rule prohibiting non-judicial foreclosure. Id. at 4 n.8. In ten other states,
judicial foreclosure is impliedly required by the absence of any statute or rule authorizing or
recognizing non-judicial foreclosure. Id. Thus, the Montana judicial and non-judicial scheme
affords greater flexibility for the foreclosing creditor than in some states.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6 for the definition of the "equity of redemption." Most mortgage instruments contain acceleration clauses enabling the creditor to accelerate the remaining principal balance of the debtor's installment promissory obligations
thus prohibiting the debtor from repeatedly repaying only arrearage amounts. See NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.6, at 488. Prior to the sale, however, the debtor always has the
right to pay the accelerated balance of the debt and retain the property. NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 33. See also Bohan v. Harris, 71 Mont. 495, 230 P. 586 (1924).
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1987).
40. See infra notes 100-134 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of this
rule.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1987).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-704 (1987) only refers to the "highest bidders" as being
entitled to purchase.
43. Interior Securities Co. v. Campbell, 55 Mont. 459, 466, 178 P. 582, 584 (1919).
44. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-801 through -825 (1987). Montana, like about half
the states, requires all judicial mortgage foreclosure sales to be subject to some form of
statutory redemption. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 616. In Montana, the
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Traditional Mortgage with Power of Sale

A traditional mortgage can contain a power of sale provision
that enables the mortgagee to conduct a summary sale of the mortgaged property, without judicial foreclosure or sale by the sheriff."'
It is not the same device as a trustee's sale under a deed of trust."
Unlike the foreclosure of a traditional mortgage that is subject to
the general notice provisions of execution sales,4 7 the power of sale
foreclosure requires more stringent notice, publication, and posting
of the sale." At the sale, the mortgagee cannot purchase 49 and the
debtor has the same one-year right of redemption as under a judicial foreclosure.5 0 The creditor cannot obtain a deficiency judgment
under a power of sale foreclosure. 1
3.

The Deed of Trust-Non-Judicial Foreclosure

Montana's Small Tract Financing Act creates a distinct nonjudicial foreclosure procedure "by advertisement and sale" for
deeds of trust less than fifteen acres.52 The Act supplements the
judicial mortgage foreclosure procedures. 5 3 Under the Act, the
creditor has the option to judicially foreclose a deed of trust.5 4 Spe55
cifically, the Act provides that "at the option of the beneficiary,
the trust indenture may be foreclosed "by judicial procedure as
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property."'5 a The Act also provides that "[a] trust indenture is deemed
to be a mortgage on real property and is subject to all laws relating
mortgagor has one year's right of redemption after the sheriff's foreclosure sale of the traditional or power of sale mortgage, and under a deed of trust securing any kind of property
occupied other than as a single family residence. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-228 (1987);
- Mont. -,
-, 734 P.2d 1203, 1210 (1987). HowFirst State Bank v. Chunkapura,
ever, the debtor has no redemption rights after a judicial sale of an occupied, single family
residential property under a deed of trust, or after any deed of trust property sold nonjudicially at a trustee's sale. Id. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-228 through -304 (1987).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-223 (1987).
46. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-223 and 71-1-304 (1987).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-701 (1987).
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-224 (1987) requires advertisement for thirty days or posting in five conspicuous places in the county, additional posting requirements, and personal
service on the property occupant, the mortgagor if within Montana, and all other interested
persons if within Montana.
49. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 74 Mont. 70, 237 P. 518 (1925).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-228 (1987).
51. First Nat'l Corp. v. Perrine, 99 Mont. 454, 43 P.2d 1073 (1935).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304 (1987).
53. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-305 (1987).
54. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(3) (1987).
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(3) (1987).
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(3) (1987).
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to mortgages... except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with [the Small Tract Financing Act]. 57
To foreclose by advertisement and sale, the mortgagee-beneficiary must meet certain conditions. 8 General conditions for nonjudicial foreclosure of the deed of trust include: proper recordation
of the trust indenture at the appropriate clerk and recorder's office, a default under the obligation secured by the deed of trust,
and recordation of the notice of the trustee's sale, which must include certain statutorily required information."
The Act also contains specific "advertisement and sale" requirements.6 0 At least 120 days prior to the sale date, the creditor
must send, by certified or registered mail, a copy of the recorded
notice of trustee's sale to statutorily designated parties." The
creditor must also post the recorded notice of the trustee's sale on
the property at least twenty days before the sale date,"' publish
the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation for a required period,63 and record with the local clerk and recorder affidavits of mailing, posting, and publication showing compliance with
the foregoing requirements."'
The strict notice provisions of the advertisement and sale foreclosure method insure compliance with fourteenth amendment due
process notice requirements under the United States Constitution. 5 No Montana court has ruled on the constitutionality of the
notice provisions of the Act. The acreage limitations6 6 of the Act,
however, do not constitute an unconstitutional classification under
67
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Upholding its constitutionality, the Montana Supreme Court held
that the acreage classification was reasonable, in light of the financial-development objective of the Act." The court also noted that
it created a means for the lender to obtain title to collateral
outside the judicial process, avoiding the cost of traditional foreclo57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-305 (1987).
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-313 (1987).
59. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-313(3) (1987) (listing requirements).
60. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315 (1987).
61. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(1)(a) (1987) (listing designated parties).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(1)(b) (1987).
63. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(1)(c) (1987) (specifying time requirements).
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(2) (1987).
65. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.24, at 562.
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(1) (1987) limits the deed of trust to no greater than
fifteen-acre tracts (formerly three acres).
67. Great Falls Nat'l Bank v. McCormick, 152 Mont. 319, 323, 448 P.2d 991, 993
(1968).
68. Id.
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sure methods. 9
4. The Deed of Trust-Comparison of Judicial and Non-Judicial Foreclosure
The non-judicial foreclosure method affords the beneficiarymortgagee the option to foreclose the deed of trust by invoking the
operation of the judicial foreclosure procedures.7 0 These procedures include compliance with the one action rule, the primary
debtor protection under the judicial foreclosure scheme. 1
The advertisement and sale foreclosure method and the judicial foreclosure method differ in several fundamental respects. In
contrast to Montana's one action rule, which permits the docketing
of a deficiency judgment after compliance with that rule,7 2 the "no
further action" rule of the non-judicial foreclosure scheme 73 prohibits any:
[o]ther or further action, suit, or proceedings, . . . taken or judgment entered for any deficiency against the grantor or his surety,
guarantor, or successor in interest, if any, on the note, bond, or
other obligation secured by the trust indenture or against any
other person obligated on such note, bond, or other obligation.
Primarily, a facial reading of the no further action statute prohibits any deficiency judgment against the debtor after a non-judicial
sale. It also protects "any other person" obligated on "such ...
other obligation" from any "other or further action or proceedings"
after the advertisement and sale foreclosure. The statute therefore
extends specifically to guarantors and co-makers of the obligation
secured by the trust indenture.7 ' In contrast, the judicial one action rule does not provide, on its face, such extensive protection
although the "one action" requirement of the rule makes its protection at least as extensive as the no further action rule.7 5
The non-judicial and judicial foreclosure methods also differ
with respect to the debtor's right to avoid acceleration of installment payments not yet due. Under the provisions in the standard
mortgage, the mortgagee has power to accelerate the outstanding
69.

Id.

70.
71.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 71-1-304(3) (1987).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222(1) (1987).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222(2) (1987).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1987).

72.
73.
74. In this respect the statute mirrors the judicial foreclosure requirements that the
note merges into the judgment and is thereby exonerated. Lepper v. Jackson, 102 Mont.
259, 57 P.2d 768 (1936).
75. See infra notes 100-134 and accompanying text.
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principal amount secured by the mortgage, to refuse any tendered
reinstatement payments, and to commence foreclosure.7 6 Under
the non-judicial procedure, however, the mortgagor-grantor has the
right "at any time prior to the time fixed by the trustee for the
trustee's sale to reinstate the entire amount then due under the
77
terms of the trust indenture and the obligation secured thereby."
At such time, the advertisement and sale foreclosure method
ceases and the trust indenture "shall be reinstated ... and remain
7' 8
in force and effect the same as if no acceleration had occurred.
Under Montana's judicial foreclosure statutes, the mortgagor
has a nonwaivable 79 one-year right of redemption" ° after the sheriff's sale that includes the right to remain in possession if the
debtor personally occupies the property.8' The advertisement and
sale foreclosure procedure affords no such right of redemption to
the grantor-mortgagor in the event of non-judicial sale."
Chunkapura explains the rationale for the elimination of the
debtor's right of redemption:
The banking and lending industry came to the legislature in 1963,
contending that the "one action" rule and the attendant right of
redemption and right of possession rules hampered the financing
of improvements on small tracts in Montana because banks and
investors were unwilling to invest in mortgages when on default
their funds would be tied up during the period of redemption. A
quid pro quo was proposed to the legislature: the lenders would
give up their deficiency judgment rights on default, if the borrowers would give up their rights of possession and redemption.. The
result was the adoption by the legislature of the Small Tract Financing Act of Montana, originally limited to tracts of three
76. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.6, at 488-89. The lender, however, must
accept tender of the entire accelerated balance. See supra note 38.
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-312(1) (1987).
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-312(2) (1987).
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-229 (1987) (prohibiting waiver prior to sale).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-802 (1987).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-821 (1987).
82. The purchaser at the trustee's sale is entitled to possession ten days following the
sale. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-319 (1987). The foregoing presents only a partial comparison
between the judicial and non-judicial foreclosure methods in Montana. Other major differences include the use of receivers in judicial foreclosure actions to preserve the value of the
collateral or collect rents and profits. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-102 (1987). See also
Hastings v. Wise, 89 Mont. 325, 297 P. 482 (1931); Long v. W.P. Devereux Co., 87 Mont.
198, 286 P. 402 (1930); Masterson v. Hubbert, 54 Mont. 613, 173 P. 421 (1918). Because an
"action" for the appointment of a receiver must be made in the foreclosure action, arguably
a creditor must foreclose a deed of trust judicially and request a receiver in that action
rather than independently of a request for a receiver. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222
(1987); Hartnett v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 51 Mont. 395, 153 P. 437 (1915).
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acres, but now may involve tracts as large as fifteen acres.8 3
5.

Chunkapura: Foreclosing the Deed of Trust Judicially

Prior to Chunkapura, judicial and non-judicial foreclosure
methods were distinct in Montana. If the mortgagee-beneficiary judicially foreclosed the deed of trust, it could obtain a deficiency
judgment subject to the one action rule and trigger the debtor's
statutory redemption rights. 8" In Chunkapura, however, the court
was required to decide whether a lender could obtain a deficiency
judgment after a judicial foreclosure of a residential deed of trust
where the value of the residential property had declined. 5The
Chunkapuras' deed of trust property was originally an occupied,
single-family residence. 86 At the time of sale, the Chunkapuras
owed First Bank Of Forsyth approximately $18,000.00, including
sheriff and attorney fees. 87 The bank bid $10,000 on the property
leaving a net deficiency judgment in the amount of $8,556.93."s
The parties stipulated to a sale of the property but submitted to
the court the issue of the bank's ability to pursue a deficiency
judgment. 9 The district court ordered that the "no further action"
rule of the non-judicial foreclosure statutes prohibited the docketing of a deficiency judgment, even though the bank had elected to
judicially foreclose the deed of trust."
Statutorily, the court found a contradiction between the nonjudicial statutes eliminating the right of redemption and the
lender's right to a deficiency judgment on one hand and the statute
allowing the lender to elect judicial foreclosure on the other
hand. 1 Based on this stated inadequacy of Montana's statutes, the
court made a roaming examination of certain fair market value,
anti-deficiency, and upset price statutes in other western states.2
83. Mont. -,
734 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1987).
-,
84. The State Bank of Forsyth advanced this argument. Id. at __,
734 P.2d at 1206.
85. Id. at , 734 P.2d at 1208.
86. However, by the time of foreclosure sale, the improvements on the property had
been removed leaving the collateral as a vacant lot. Letter from John Houtz (counsel for the
Chunkapuras) to David Dietrich (Dec. 10, 1987). At the time the loan was granted to the
Chunkapuras, the loan and deed of trust were for a single family residence. Eventually, due
to the deteriorating condition of the house, the house was torn down and an empty lot
remained. The Chunkapuras relocated and continued to pay on the loan, and when they
stopped paying on the loan, the bank started foreclosure proceedings.
87. Chunkapura, - Mont. at -, 734 P.2d at 1204.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at __, 734 P.2d at 1206.
92. Id. at __, 734 P.2d at 1207-08.
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The court concluded its analysis by finding that Montana and
Alaska do not have any protective legislation limiting the deficiency amount to the difference between the amount of the indebtedness sought and the fair market value of the property at the
time of the sale."
In its initial opinion, the court simply denied the creditor any
right to pursue a deficiency judgment after judicial foreclosure of
any Montana deed of trust and stripped the debtor of any right of
redemption on the property."4 In reaching the decision, the court
noted the absence of any statutory limit on the price bid by the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, exposing the residential borrower
to a double liability: the loss of the residence and exposure to a
deficiency judgment.9 5 As later modified in the Order On Rehearing, the court limited the application of its decision to occupied
single family residential deeds of trust,9 excluding more complicated loans secured by agricultural or commercial deeds of trust.9 "
In its analysis, the court stated that "prior to 1963 Montana
was a one action rule state" 98 implying that the adoption of the
non-judicial foreclosure statutes displaced Montana law governing
judicial foreclosure.9 9 The remaining applicability of the judicial
foreclosure scheme and its interrelationship with article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code are dealt with in the following two sections in this article.
IV.

MONTANA'S ONE ACTION RULE

A.

Introduction

Section 71-1-222 of the Montana Code Annotated governs the
foreclosure of the traditional mortgage in Montana. ' The Mon93. Id. at -,
734 P.2d at 1208.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at
, 734 P.2d at 1210.
97. Id.
98. Id. at __, 734 P.2d at 1204.
99. The court noted that since the adoption of the Small Tract Financing Act, enabling non-judicial deed of trust foreclosures, the use of deeds of trust has become nearly
exclusive. Id. at -,
734 P.2d at 1205. Nothing in the record supported that conclusion
and mortgages subject to the one action rule continue to be used in a variety of commercial
and agricultural contexts.
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 provides in part as follows:
(1) There is but one action for the recovery of debt or the enforcement of any
right secured by mortgage upon real estate, which action must be in accordance
with the provisions of this part. In such action the court may, by its judgment,
direct:
(a) a sale of the encumbered property (or so much thereof as may be
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tana Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that with the
statute's adoption from the California Code of Civil Procedure,
Montana also adopted the construction given to the statute by the
Supreme Court of California. °1
As originally enacted and prior to the adoption of article 9 of
the Montana Uniform Commercial Code, the statute required that
one action alone be initiated "for the recovery of debt, or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real estate or
personalproperty ... ."10 The reference to personal property was
excluded from the statute by amendment during the 1963 legislative session, 0 s presumably so that the enforcement scheme of article 9 would apply without conflict with the irreconcilable one action provision. The California legislature similarly amended section
726 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 04
B.

Purpose of One Action Rule

The one action rule compels the creditor with mortgage security to exhaust that security before having recourse to the general
assets of the debtor. 05 Otherwise stated, the rule means that in the
event of a default, the mortgagee's sole remedy is a foreclosure action and that any deficiency claim must be brought in that proceeding. 0 6 The rule also protects the mortgagor against a multiplicity of actions when two separate actions, though theoretically
distinct, are so closely connected that normally they can and
10 7
should be decided in one suit.
necessary);
(b) the application of the proceeds of the sale; and
(c) payment of the costs of the court, the expenses of the sale, and the
amount due the plaintiff.
(2) If it appears from the sheriff's return that the proceeds are insufficient
and a balance still remains due, judgment can then be docketed for such balance
against the defendant or defendants personally liable for the debt, and it becomes
a lien upon the real estate of such judgment debtor, as in other cases on which
execution may be issued.
101. See Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 278 P. 1002 (1929). Brophy v. Downey, 26 Mont.
252, 67 P. 312 (1902); Largey v. Chapman, 18 Mont. 563, 46 P. 808 (1896).
102. MONTANA REVISED CODES § 9467 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter R.C.M.].
103. Uniform Commercial Code, 1963 Mont. Laws 264, § 11-166.
104. Hetland, The "Mixed Collateral"Amendments to California'sCommercial Code,
75 CAL. L. REV. 185, 195 n.43 (1987).
105. Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 320, 278 P. 1002, 1006 (1929).
106. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.2, at 598.
107. Id. See also Stallings v. Erwin, 148 Mont. 227, 233, 419 P.2d 480, 483 (1966).
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C.

Construction of the One Action Rule-Debtor's Protections

1. Adequacy of Security is Lender's Risk
In 1929, in Barth v. Ely, 0 8 the Montana Supreme Court reconciled the restrictions contained in Montana's one action rule
with the predecessor to section 71-3-110 that provided that "'the
existence of a lien, as security for the performance of an obligation,
does not affect the right of the creditor to enforce the obligation
without regard to the lien . .. "'109 The creditor in that case attempted to waive the mortgage security, sue on the note alone, and
avoid the requirement of the one action rule that the mortgage security be foreclosed.11 0 The court thus faced the question of
whether the creditor must foreclose on inadequate, although not
valueless security.' Holding for the debtor, the court determined
that the more specific statute, the one action rule, prevailed over
the lien waiver provision." 2 In so doing, the court provided a
clearer definition as to the use of the term "secured" in the one
action rule statute:
'

The word "secured". . . does not mean that the security shall be
adequate, or that in case prior liens upon it would exhaust the
money derived from the land conveyed as security on a sale of it,
then the plaintiff is relieved from bringing the action to foreclose.
The proper construction of the language of the statute is, that if
the mortgage on its face purports to be a security to the plaintiff,
then he must bring his action for foreclosure."'
2.

Suit on Note Alone Prohibited; Waiver

Two years later in Coburn v. Coburn,"4 the Montana court
confronted the question of whether a creditor's prior personal
judgment on a promissory note secured by a mortgage constituted
a waiver of the mortgage security in a subsequent action to foreclosure. The court prohibited the creditor from maintaining the subsequent foreclosure action." 5 It noted that to hold otherwise would
be tb sanction two actions where the statute limits the creditor to
one. The court reasoned that "the tendency of modern legislation
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

85 Mont. 310, 278 P. 1002 (1929).
Id. at 317, 278 P. at 1005.

Id.
Id. at 326, 278 P. at 1008.
Id. at 323, 278 P. at 1007.
Id. at 326, 278 P. at 1008 (citations omitted).
89 Mont. 386, 298 P. 349 (1931).
Id. at 389, 298 P. at 350.
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is to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and no one doubts the wisdom
of it.""' 6
3. Mortgagee Cannot Maintain Separate Action for Taxes Secured by Mortgage
In Stallings v. Erwin,1 17 the mortgagee purchased a tax sale
certificate for taxes the mortgagor failed to pay. " 8 After a third
party purchased the property at the sheriff's sale of the mortgagee's mortgage foreclosure action, the third party moved to quiet
title to the property to eliminate the mortgagee's tax lien." 9 The
mortgagee argued that its tax lien survived the foreclosure sale and
was subrogated to the county's first lien position. 2 The Montana
Supreme Court rejected that argument on the basis that the one
action rule prohibited any subsequent action for "any right" secured by the mortgage.' 2' Thus, the court required the mortgagee
"to satisfy all claims arising out of the mortgage in a single foreclosure action."122
D.

Construction of the One Action Rule-The Change in
Circumstances Exception

Another line of cases protects the creditor from engaging in a
needless foreclosure action if the security is valueless through no
fault of the creditor. The Montana Supreme Court explained this
m ' "where there has been a change of cirrule in Bailey v. Hansen:
cumstances, after the taking of the mortgage resulting in the fact
that it has become valueless, this fact may be shown without
resorting to the useless procedure of foreclosure."' 2 Thus, in
Brophy v. Downey,"15 a second lienholder whose lien was extinguished by the foreclosure of a first lien mortgage could maintain a
direct action on the note even after the expiration of the redemption period." 6 Similarly, in Bailey where the mortgagor defrauded
the mortgagee, representing that no prior encumbrances existed on
116. Id.
117. 148 Mont. 227, 419 P.2d 480 (1966).
118. Id. at 228, 419 P.2d at 481.
119. Id. at 229, 419 P.2d at 481.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 231, 419 P.2d at 482.
122. Id. at 233, 419 P.2d at 483.
123. 105 Mont. 552, 74 P.2d 438 (1937).
124. Id. at 556, 74 P.2d at 440. See also Annotation, Action on Secured Debt- When
Permissible, 108 A.L.R. 397 (1937).
125. 26 Mont. 252, 67 P. 312 (1902).
126. Id. at 258, 67 P.2d at 315.
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the premises when in fact a prior mortgage existed making the second lienholder's security valueless,"2 7 the mortgagee was entitled to
maintain a direct action on the note. The exception to the one action rule also applies where a tax lien foreclosure renders the security of the second lienholder valueless. 12'8 The exception further
applies where the debtor-mortgagor is not the real party raising
the one action rule as a defense; indeed, in Leffek v. Luedeman 2 9
the unsecured creditors in an estate unsuccessfully raised the one
action rule as a defense to an action by a creditor who failed to file
the required renewal affidavit on a mortgage and sought to maintain a direct action on the note in the estate.'3 °
The doctrine of estoppel, however, limits the creditor's ability
to claim the change in circumstances exception: "where plaintiff
voluntarily takes security for a debt, whether a first or second
mortgage, and there is no change of circumstances, he must foreclose and cannot assert that the security has become valueless." ' '
Thus, "so long as the security has value, the only action that will
lie on the mortgage debt is the statutory action on foreclosure.' '132
No recent Montana cases address the current application of
this exception. However, a recent Utah case, construing that state's
similar one action rule, refused to allow a second- position mortgagee to sue directly on the note prior to the senior lienholder's foreclosure sale. The creditor merely estimated a deficiency by affidavit on summary judgment.13 3 It reasoned as follows: "It is not
enough to speculate that the security is valueless, or might become
valueless if foreclosed by the senior lienholder. Rather, the security
must be, in fact, exhausted and a deficiency established to a certainty in order for the exception to apply." 3 " The mortgagee must
show that the security has been foreclosed and sold or otherwise
lost by no fault of the mortgagee prior to the commencement of
the action on the note.
127.

Bailey, 105 Mont. at 558, 74 P.2d at 441.

128. Id. at 557, 74 P.2d at 441. See also Quickenden v. Hulbert, 83 Mont. 501, 509-10,
272 P. 994, 998 (1928); Richardson v. Lloyd, 90 Mont. 127, 131, 300 P. 254, 256 (1931).
129. 95 Mont. 457, 27 P.2d 511 (1933).
130. Id.
131.

Bailey, 105 Mont. at 557, 74 P.2d at 441.

132.

Id.

133. Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 -36 (Utah 1983).
134. Id. at 1336. See also Gebrueder Heidemann K.G. v. A.M.R. Corp., 107 Idaho 275,
282, 688 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 96 Nev. 509, 611 P.2d 1079
(1980).
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THE MIXED COLLATERAL PROBLEM
A.

Nature of the Problem

The requirement that the creditor exhaust all real property security in one action raises complications when the debt is secured
by both a mortgage on real property and a security interest in personal property. 1 5 Montana has developed little case law in this
area. California case law construing its substantially similar "one
action rule" and provisions of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code13 provide important warnings to the Montana creditor.
As noted above, after the adoption by Montana of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1959, the one action rule was amended
in 1963 to exclude any reference to personal property. Additionally, section 30-9-501(4) of the Montana Code Annotated, of the
Montana Commercial Code effectively subordinates a creditor's judicial remedies under article 9 of that code to the one action rule.
That section provides:
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property,
the secured party may proceed (under part 5 of article 9) as to
the personal property, or he may proceed as to both the real and
the personal property in accordance with his rights and remedies
in respect of the real property, in which case the provisions (part
5 of article 9) do not apply.
Furthermore, section 30-9-508 of the Montana Code Annotated,
also part of article 9, provides:
An action for the foreclosure of a security interest in personal
property may be commenced and conducted in the same manner
as provided by law for the foreclosure by action of mortgages
upon real property, and the same may be joined in an action for
the recovery of the possession of the property subject to the security interest, but the remedial scope of proceedings for the foreclosure of interests subject to this chapter is governed by [part 5
of article 9].137
B.

Mixed Collateral and Judicial Foreclosure

Under these statutes, together with the unequivocal, exclusive language of the one action rule, 138 a creditor holding a single promis135. See generally Hetland, supra, note 104.
136. Id.
137. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-80-508 (1987) (emphasis added).
138. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1987) unequivocally states "[tihere is but one action for the recovery of debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real
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sory note secured by, for example, a mortgage and a security interest in the debtor's farm machinery has several choices. In the event
of default, the creditor can employ the self-help remedy of article 9
and repossess" 9 the tractor without resort to judicial process, crediting the outstanding amount on the note paid by the sum received
at the commercially reasonable sale of the machinery. " " If, however, the creditor files a provisional remedy action and obtains, for
example, claim and delivery of the personal property to preserve
its value pending foreclosure, in California that creditor has waived
1 41
any right to sue on the mortgage in a subsequent judicial action.
Procedurally, in California the debtor may compel the creditor
to include all the security he has for that debt in a single judicial
foreclosure by raising the one action rule as an affirmative defense.14 1 Montana also holds that the debtor's raising of the one
action rule is an affirmative defense.1 43 When the creditor fails to
exhaust all his security in one action and the debtor fails to compel
him to do so by affirmatively raising his one action rule defense, a
problem arises. When the creditor tries to recover the balance owing or take the remaining security, the one action rule triggers the
14 4
following questions:
1. Does the creditor's failure to exhaust all security in one
14 5
action affect his right to realize on the additional security?
2. Can he take a deficiency or personal judgment on the bal14

ance owing?

1

3. May the creditor bring another action to foreclose on the
7

balance of the security?

estate.
139. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-503 (1987). Private repossession of article 9 property
should not invoke the "one action" rule unless the creditor requires the debtor to respond in
a judicial action. But see Bank of America v. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1984), holding that a checking account offset triggers the one action rule, waiving the real
property security and the balance of the debt.
140. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-504 (1987).
141. Epstein v. Enterprise Leasing Corp., 189 Cal. App. 3rd 834, 234 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1987) (Ordered not officially published. Rule 967, Cal. Rules of Court). But see Forbush v.
San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho 231, 266 P. 659 (1928).
142. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726 (1987); Pacific Valley Bank v. Schwenke, 189 Cal.
App. 3d 134, 234 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1987).
143. Brophy, 26 Mont. at 256, 67 P. at 314.
144. Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 733 n.2, 518 P.2d 329, 331-32 n.2, 111
Cal. Rptr. 897, 899-900 n.2 (1974). See also Epstein, 189 Cal. App. 3d 834 n.4, 234 Cal. Rptr.
676, 680 n.4.
145. Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 733 n.2, 518 P.2d at 332 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 900 n.2.
146. Id.; see also Epstein, 189 Cal. App. 3d 834, 234 Cal. Rptr. 676; Pacific Valley
Bank, 189 Cal. App. 3d 134, 234 Cal. Rptr. 298; Bank of America, 152 Cal. App. 2d 767, 199
Cal. Rptr. 557.
147. Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 734 n.2, 518 P.2d at 332 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 900 n.2. See
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4. Can he foreclose the balance by nonjudicial sale? " "
5. If the creditor foreclosed on none of his security but instead took a personal judgment against the debtor, does he retain
his former lien priority when he attempts to execute on the real
property that previously was his security? " 9
To each of these questions but the first, commentators examining the relationship between the one action rule and the identified article 9 provision answer "No." 150 Consequently, the most expansive construction of the one action rule imposes a strict
requirement that the creditor be forced to exhaust all security in
one action to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The rule also encourages competitive bidding to test the value of all the security for the
debt, thus forcing the creditor to look to all security as a primary
fund for payment of the indebtedness before looking to the
debtor's personal assets. 5 1 If the debtor does not raise the one action rule as an affirmative defense, he may still invoke it as a sanction under California law against the creditor. 152 Courts reason
that since the creditor has not foreclosed on its security in the action brought to enforce the debt, 5 3 the creditor has made an election of remedies and has waived the security,1 54 and, in some cases,
the balance of the debt.'
C.
1.

Mixed Collateral and Non-judicial Foreclosure

Walker v. Community Bank

Walker v Community Bank, 5 6 the seminal California case on
the mixed collateral security problem, expanded the rule to prohibit a trustee's non-judicial sale after a judicial action on personal
property. 15 7 In Walker, both real and personal property secured a
single debt and the creditor judicially foreclosed only on the personal property and obtained a deficiency judgment. 58 In a later
also Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal.2d 263, 138 P.2d 7 (1943); Epstein, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 234
Cal. Rptr. 'at 676.
148. Walker, 10 Cal.3d at 734 n.2, 518 P.2d at 332 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 900 n.2.
149. Id.
150. Id.; See also Epstein, 189 Cal. App. 3d 834, 234 Cal. Rptr. 676.
151. Epstein, 189 Cal. App. 3d 834, 234 Cal. Rptr. 676.
152. Id.
153. Pacific Valley Bank, 189 Cal. App. 3d 134, 234 Cal. Rptr. 298; Bank of America,
152 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
154. Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 733, 518 P.2d at 331, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
155. Pacific Valley Bank, 189 Cal. App. 3d 134, 234 Cal. Rptr. 298; Bank of America,
152 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
156. 10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897.
157. Id. at 732, 518 P.2d at 331, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
158. Id. at 732, 518 P.2d at 331, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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action to foreclose the deed of trust nonjudicially, the court permitted the debtor to invoke the "sanction" aspect of section 726(4)
of the California Civil Code. 1 9 The court held that the creditor
lost its security interest in the real property as against all parties.160 Importantly, the Walker court prohibited a non-judicial
trust indenture trustee's sale. 6 ' The court relied on section 580(d)
of the California Civil Code, the anti-deficiency provision governing non-judicial foreclosures of deeds of trust,62 similar in effect to section 71-1-317 of the Montana Code Annotated. 163 The
court reasoned that to permit the creditor to file a judicial action
on the personal property and seek a deficiency judgment would allow the creditor to circumvent the one action rule and anti-deficiency protections.16 4 In so ruling, the court prevented the creditor
from merely acquiring an insignificant amount of personal property, proceeding to judicially foreclose the personal property, and
obtaining a deficiency judgment in such action and thereafter
nonjudicially foreclosing the real property security. 6 5 Consequently, the Walker court imposed a sanction on the creditor even
though the debtor did not raise the one action rule and anti-deficiency statutes as affirmative defenses: the creditor lost its security
interest in the real property. 6
2. Walker and Montana's No Further Action Rule
Section 71-1-317 of the Montana Code Annotated invites application of Walker to Montana non-judicial foreclosures. That
section provides that after a non-judicial "advertisement and sale"
sale, "no other or further action, suit, or proceedings shall be taken
or judgment entered for any deficiency against the grantor or his
surety, guarantor, or successor in interest, if any, on the note,
bond, or other obligation secured by the trust indenture." This section is the non-judicial "one action rule" without the "action" requirement; it requires an exoneration of the note and prevents any
further action or proceedings on it after the trustee's sale.
Under Walker, if a creditor judicially forecloses on a selected
item of personal property collateral securing a single promissory
159. Id. at 741-42, 518 P.2d at 337, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 735, 518 P.2d at 333, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
162. Id. at 736, 518 P.2d at 333-34, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
163. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
164. Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 736-37, 518 P.2d at 334, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 741, 518 P.2d at 337, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
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note and later seeks a deficiency judgment, the anti-deficiency language of the "no further action" statute would void the creditor's
security interest in the deed of trust and preclude any further nonjudicial trustee's sale. 167 If, however, the creditor exercises non-judicial article 9 self help remedies and does not seek a deficiency
judgment, lenders have successfully argued that the creditor does
not lose the right to pursue additional security. 18a Although there
are no Montana cases on point, this result could obtain under the
"no further action" rule because the "action or proceeding" preceded the non-judicial sale and did not result in the lender pursuing a deficiency. If the creditor attempts to sell the personal property judicially or nonjudicially after the trustee's sale, he is barred
from any remedies as to the personal property ("no other or further action or proceeding"). 69 Thus, if a creditor has cross-collateralized a single obligation with both personal and real property
collateral, he must sequence his judicial or non-judicial article 9
repossession of the property before the non-judicial trustee's
70
sale.1
3.

Avco: Limits on the No Further Action Rule

7
1
The Montana case of Avco FinancialServices v. Christiaens1
provides a limited exception to this rule, however, in the event a
junior deed of trust lienholder's interest has been foreclosed
nonjudicially by a senior lienholder.172 In that case, the debtor
granted a personal property security interest and a second position
trust deed to Avco.17 3 Nationwide held the first position trust indenture.17" Avco purchased the property at Nationwide's trustee's
sale and subsequently sold the property. 7 5 Because the senior

167. Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 735, 518 P.2d 329, 333, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901.
168. Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955) permitted the lender to
pursue additional security after a non-judicial power of sale foreclosure on the basis that
"the pursuit of additional security is not the pursuit of a deficiency judgment .... " By
extension, if the creditor pursues non-judicial article 9 remedies prior to pursuing its real
estate mortgage and does not seek any deficiency judgment (there being no action resulting
in a judgment), a subsequent action to foreclose real estate security does not violate either
Montana's one action rule or its no further action rule. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-222,
-317 (1987). But see note 188 and cases cited therein.
169. The "no other or further action, suit, or proceedings" language of section 71-1317 (emphasis added) requires this result. But see Avco Fin. Servs. v. Christiaens, 201 Mont.
117, 652 P.2d 220 (1982).
170. See also infra note 190.
171. 201 Mont. 117, 652 P.2d 220 (1982).
172. Id. at 120, 652 P.2d at 222.
173. Id. at 118, 652 P.2d at 221.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 119, 652 P.2d at 221.
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lienholder's trustee's deed eliminated the security position of Avco,
the court held that Avco was not prevented from waiving its personal property collateral and suing on the note.17 The court reasoned that the creditor under article 9 could waive its security interest in the personal property, obtain a judgment on the note, and
proceed by execution and levy. 1 77 The court also reasoned that because the senior lienholder's (Nationwide) foreclosure extinguished
the junior lienholder's lien, the second position lienholder should
be relieved from the restrictive requirements of the "no further action" rule and allowed to sue on the note alone.'7 8
4.

Avoidance of the Mixed Collateral Problem

The one action rule has no application if the creditor makes
separate debts with separate security.'7 9 Thus, the creditor can
avoid the one action rule by breaking the single transaction into
obligations secured separately by real and personal property at the
outset.' The one action rule does not apply to recovery on a separate, unsecured note, although the note was part of a transaction
where real property or property collateral secured other notes.' 8 '
Thus, a lender can finance the purchase of a hotel by breaking the
single purchase price into separate debts, evidenced by separate
notes, each a part of the total price, securing one note by the hotel,
another by personal property and fixtures, and leaving still another
unsecured.' 8 2 The result would be that the real property foreclosure and deficiency limitations would apply only to the notes secured by the hotel.' 88 The separate note secured by the personal
property and fixtures would be subject only to the Uniform Commercial Code. The unsecured note would be fully collectible with
no security-related procedural or substantive limitations on the
creditor's judicial or self-help enforcement of the debt.' 84
However, if the debt is structured as an obligation that is not
validly broken up into separate debts, the one action rule applies.
If the nominally separate notes either duplicated each other or
176.
177.
178.
179.
Rptr. 873,
180.
181.
(1961).
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 120, 652
Id.
Id. at 122, 652
Roseleaf Corp.
876-77 (1963).
Id.
Christopherson

P.2d at 222.
P.2d at 223.
v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 38-39, 378 P.2d 97, 100-01, 27 Cal.

v. Allen, 190 Cal. App. 2d 848, 851-52, 12 Cal. Rptr. 658, 660

Hetland, supra note 104, at 196.
Id. See also Kistler v. Vasi, 71 Cal. 2d 261, 455 P.2d 106, 78 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1969).
Hetland, supra note 104, at 196.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1988

23

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 49
[1988], Iss. 2, Art. 5
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 49

represented the same consideration, creditors must comply with
the rule. 88 Similarly, if one separate note was cross-collateralized
or secured even in small part by real property, then the mixed collateral problem exists. 8 6
5.

Summary on How To Avoid the Mixed Collateral Problem

To summarize, the following are options available to a Montana creditor seeking to foreclose a single note secured by both
personal and real property security:
1. The lender can proceed non-judicially 18 7 by private repossession of the collateral prior to the filing of any judicial mortgage
188
foreclosure action and credit the amount received after sale.
2. The lender may include all personal property collateral contemporaneously with the judicial real property foreclosure of the
deed of trust or mortgage, or consciously waive any claim as to
such personal property collateral. 189
3. If the trustee is able to obtain possession of the personal
property collateral and conduct an article 9 public sale, the lender
may include both personal and real property security as part of the
non-judicial trustee's sale. 90
4. If the value of the real property has become worthless
through no fault of the creditor, usually through foreclosure by a
senior lienholder, the creditor can proceed judicially or non-judicially as to the personal property. In addition, the creditor can
waive pursuit of the personal property in favor of a levy and execu185. Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal. 2d 462, __,
289 P.2d 463, 465 (1965).
186. Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1974). See also Hetland, supra note 104, at 193 n.33.
187. Sale of certain kinds of personal property collateral requires a judicial foreclosure
action, however.
188. Caveat: Any recourse to collateral by the lender prior to a judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure under California law prior to the 1986 amendments resulted in possible waiver of
not only the security but also the debt. See Epstein v. Enterprise Leasing Corp., 189 Cal.
App. 3d 834, 234 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984) (private sale of collateral after claim and delivery
held to violate the one action rule); see also Bank of America v. Dailey, 152 Cal. App. 3d
767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984) (exercise of self help remedy of banker's offset violated the
one action rule).
189. This method is probably the safest because it assures the lender of compliance
with the various protections underlying the one action rule. See generally Epstein, 189 Cal.
App. 3d 834, 234 Cal. Rptr. 676.
190. Nothing in Montana's non-judicial foreclosure scheme prohibits a trustee from
selling personal property collateral at the trustee's sale; however, practicalities may prevent
the trustee from delivery of possession of the personal property at a trustee's sale or conducting the personal property sale so as to maximize the return on the collateral, thus not
meeting the "commercially reasonable" standard of section 30-9-504(3) of the Montana
Code Annotated.
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tion against other property
waiver of the real property
to consummation of the
lienholder where there is a
6.

309

owned by the debtor.1 91 However, the
collateral should not be initiated prior
first
foreclosure proceedings by the
92
"mere speculated deficiency."'

Legislative Reforms

As the foregoing discussion points out, Montana's one action
rule, as construed in California, imposes severe penalties on the
creditor holding a single obligation secured by both personal and
real property collateral. Recognizing the severity of the problem, in
1986 California legislation amended that state's counterpart to section 30-9-501(4) of the Montana Code Annotated.' 9 3 The amendment now permits the creditor, upon the debtor's default, to apportion the single obligation according to the ratable portion
secured by real property and the ratable portions secured by personal property.19 4 As drafted, the amendment intended to permit
the creditor to judicially foreclose on as much of the personal property collateral as the creditor desired, risking only loss of real property collateral not included in the action. 9' 5 However, California
did not amend its one action rule, and commentators have questioned whether the sanction aspect of the one action rule still
would nullify the existence of the remaining obligation in addition
to causing a waiver of the remaining real property collateral.'9 6
The severe penalties imposed by California law on the creditor
holding a single obligation secured by real and personal property
collateral, when applied by extension to Montana's judicial mortgage foreclosure scheme, creates sufficient cause for amendment
using California's recent amendments as a starting point. Such
amendments should clarify whether the balance of the creditor's
obligation remains in place if a creditor forecloses solely on personal property when remaining real property collateral exists. Such
amendments should also clarify the circumstances under which a
creditor will be denied recourse to a deficiency judgment if it has
191. By extension, if the real property security is valueless, the creditor should be able
to waive the real property security in favor of the personal property security or a direct
action against the debtor. See supra notes 123-134 and accompanying text; Avco Fin. Servs.
v. Christiaens, 201 Mont. 117, 652 P.2d 220 (1982).
192. Whether the creditor can waive the real property security prior to actual sale is
unclear in Montana; the more cautious practice would be to wait until the sale and eliminate any speculation. See Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983).
193. CAL. COM. CODE § 9-501(4) (West Supp. 1988).
194. Hetland, supra note 104, at 190.
195. Hetland, supra note 104, at 205.
196. Hetland, supra note 104, at 206.
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not included all collateral in one "action."
VI.

SUBSTANTIVE ANTI-DEFICIENCY LAW IN MONTANA

The restrictions imposed by the one action rule, the no further
action rule, and article 9 of Montana's Uniform Commercial Code
are procedural restrictions on the foreclosure process. Montana law
also provides substantive prohibitions on deficiency judgments.
Those rules are examined in this section.
A. The Deed of Trust and Chunkapura:More Questions Than
Rules?
1. Questions Raised by Chunkapura
The Montana Supreme Court in Chunkapura confused the
procedures used in judicial and non-judicial foreclosures by applying the non-judicial anti-deficiency statute to a judicial foreclosure.197 The court's unclear distinction between residential and
commercial deeds of trust compounds this confusion. 198 In its order
on rehearing, the court limited its ruling to "occupied single-family
residential deeds of trust," ' reasoning that the "quid pro quo"
sacrifice by the lender of its right to pursue a deficiency judgment
for the borrower's sacrifice of its possessory redemption rights did.
not obtain in the commercial context.2 00 But the court held that
the possessory right of redemption only applies to a debtor and his
family who personally reside on the property.2 01
It is unclear whether Chunkapura applies to a residential deed
of trust no longer "occupied" by the mortgagor (for example, who
has rented the property). Arguably, it does not because no "quid
pro quo" applies: the mortgagor is no longer entitled personally to
any possessory redemption right.20 Under Chunkapura, it is also
unclear whether the creditor is limited to recourse to the occupied,
single-family deed of trust where personal property also secures
the same note.203 Additionally, if a lender forecloses on a multi197.
198.
199.
200.

See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
Chunkapura,
Mont. at __,
734 P.2d at 1210.
Id.
Id.

201.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 25-13-821 (1987).

202. Chunkapura, - Mont. at __, 734 P.2d at 1210.
203. Chunkapura raises this question because it applied the no further action rule to a
judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. Chunkapura, - Mont. at __,
734 P.2d at 1210.
The "no other proceeding" language of MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 may preclude recourse
to personal property collateral even if the creditor includes it as part of a judicial action to
foreclose the deed of trust. The lender, however, is not so precluded if the one action rule

governs the procedure. See

MONT. CODE ANN.
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family apartment complex, secured by a deed of trust, one unit of
which is occupied by the debtor's family, Chunkapura raises the
question of whether the complex is an occupied, residential deed of
trust. Chunkapura provides no definition of "commercial property" outside the scope of its ruling.
2. Proposed Legislation
Legislation is needed to clarify the meaning of a "commercial
deed of trust." Oregon's statute serves as a starting point.2 04 Any
definition of the term "commercial deed of trust" should identify
whether the defined commercial use begins at the execution of the
0 5
deed of trust or at the time of the entry of foreclosure judgment.
Any such definition should also identify that group of residential
occupants entitled to anti-deficiency protection.2" 6 Further, the
definition should limit the number of the multi-residential dwellings above which the property becomes commercial, the threshold
number being measured at either the time of the loan transaction
or entry of the default of judgment.2 0 7 Finally, the definition of
commercial should exclude vacant property at the time of the execution of the deed of trust to promote development,0 s thus enhancing the overall developmental object of the Small Tract Financing Act. 09
Legislative clarification of Chunkapura should also address
whether the non-judicial no further action rule or the one action
rule of Montana's judicial foreclosure procedure governs the judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust.21 0 By extending non-judicial
anti-deficiency protections to the judicial foreclosure of a deed of
204. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770 (1987).
205. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770(4)(a) (1987) defines a commercial trust indenture "at the
time of the execution of the trust indenture."
206. The definition in OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770.4(b) 1987, provides:
A trust deed covering real property which, at the time of entry of the judgment
foreclosing the trust deed, is not occupied by the grantor, the grantor's spouse or
the grantor's child as the primary residence of such person unless the property
was occupied by such person at the time the foreclosure action was commenced
and the grantor establishes the property was the only real property in which the
grantor had any interest at the time.
207. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770(4)(c) (1987) also provides the following definition of a
commercial deed of trust: "A trust deed covering real property upon which are situated four
or more residential units, either at the time of execution of the trust deed or at the time of
entry of the judgment foreclosing the trust deed ......
208. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770(4)(d) (1987) excludes vacant property from its definition
of a commercial deed of trust by defining it as: "A trust deed covering real property which is
more than one acre in size and which is vacant at the time of execution of the trust deed."

209.

MONT. CODE ANN.

210.

See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

§ 71-1-302 (1987).
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trust, Chunkapuracast doubt on the lender's ability to combine all
collateral in one foreclosure action under the one action rule.2"
B. Purchase Money Mortgage Protections
1. Montana's Two-Party Statute
Montana's purchase money mortgage statute prohibits any deficiency judgment in favor of a seller-lender against the purchaser
of a purchase money mortgage as follows:
Upon the foreclosure of any mortgage, executed to any vendor of
real property or to his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns
for the balance of the purchase price of such real property, the
mortgagee shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on ac-o
count 21of
such mortgage or note or obligation secured by the
2
same.

Passed in 1935,218 this section prohibits a deficiency judgment

in the two-party context where the mortgagee-vendor takes back a
mortgage to secure repayment of a loan advanced for the sale of
the property to the mortgagor. 14 Such statutes provide a "deficiency cushion" in the event of falling land values and the consequent deficiency exposure to a defaulting purchaser. 15 Supposedly,
the rule also discourages overvaluation by sellers; 1 6 that objective
is subject to serious question since the rule may actually encourage
overvaluation to compensate for the vendor's inability to obtain
17
anything other than the land.

2. Application to Contracts for Deed
In Aveco Properties, Inc. v. Nicholson,218 the Montana Supreme Court refused to extend the application of this section to
prohibit a vendor under contract of deed from obtaining a deficiency judgment after a sheriff's sale of the real property where the
vendor had opted to accelerate the balance of the contract and sold
211. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
212. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 (1987) (emphasis added).
213. 1935 Mont. Laws 2, § 1.
214. Facially, the term "vendor" in the statute does not include the "third party"
lender who advances money to the borrower to enable payment to the seller. But see Pulse
v. North Am. Title Co., Mont. -, 707 P.2d 1105 (1985).
215. Bargioni v. Hill, 59 Cal. 2d 121, 123, 378 P.2d 593, 594, 28 Cal. Rptr. 321, 322
(1963).
216. Id.
217. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 608-09.
218. Mont. ,747 P.2d 1358 (1987).
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the property in partial satisfaction of that balance.2 19 Although arguably the functional equivalent of a purchase money mortgage,22 °
the court in Nicholson refused to characterize a contract for deed
as a mortgage.2 2 1
3.

Application to Third-Party Lenders

The Montana purchase money mortgage statute does not, on
its face, extend beyond the two-party lender-seller context to include the third-party lending institution. In Pulse v. North American Title Co.,2 22 however, the Montana Supreme Court defined the
purchase money mortgage as "a mortgage on land executed to secure the purchase money by a purchaser of the land contemporaneously with the acquisition of the legal title thereto or afterward,
but as part of the same transaction. '' 223 Although not central to the
decision, the court held that a deed of trust given to a bank in
consideration for an enabling loan by the bank was a purchase
money mortgage.2 24 Pulse, therefore, has arguably expanded the
anti-deficiency protection under the definition of the purchase
money mortgage from the two party vendor-vendee context to the
third-party lender context.
4. Purchase Money Mortgage Statute Reforms
The Pulse decision sufficiently confuses the meaning of the
purchase money mortgage statute to require legislative amendment. Other states' legislatures have expanded the purchase money
mortgage definition to the third-party context.2 25 California prohibits a deficiency judgment under a purchase money mortgage "as
to all vendors who take back real estate security and to those
third-party lenders who take a mortgage or a deed of trust to secure all or part of the purchase price of purchaser occupied dwell219.
220.
however,
"an act,"

Id. at -,
747 P.2d at 1361.
The contract for deed provision requiring an escrowed warranty deed as security,
fits the definition of a mortgage as a contract where property is "hypothecated" for
namely, payments. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-101 (1987).
221. The stated reason for the Nicholson court's refusal to characterize a contract for
deed as a purchase money mortgage was statutory. Nicholson, - Mont. at -, 747 P.2d
at 1360. Underlying policy reasons may also include the fact that contracts for deed are the
most common form of noninstitutional seller financing in Montana. Preventing the seller
from obtaining a deficiency judgment could eliminate the ability of many buyers to obtain
seller financing when conventional financing is unavailable because of falling land values.
222. Mont. -, 707 P.2d 1105 (1985).
223. Id. at -'
707 P.2d at 1107.
224. Id. at __, 707 P.2d at 1108.
225. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(4)
(1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 88.075 (1987).
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ings less than five families. ' 22 6 In Oregon, the anti-deficiency rule
has been expanded by statute to the third-party financier context,
but only on homes financed up to $50,000.00, provided the same is
used by the purchaser as his primary or secondary single-family
22 7
residence.
Any such amendment in Montana clearly should declare
whether the statute applies in the third-party context. If so, it
should also classify the deficiency protection according to the kind
of security device, be it a contract for deed, residential or commercial deed of trust, or solely a mortgage transaction.22 8 Amendments
should also clarify whether the deficiency protection depends on
the use of the real estate, whether commercial, residential, or agricultural.22 9 The reason for this distinction centers on the differing
degree of the financial risk associated with residential as opposed
to commercial property ownership.2 30 The statute should also address whether the residential owner must occupy the property,
whether purchase money protection should be extended to only the
borrower's principal residence, and whether residential property
put to commercial use should be excluded (such as multi-family
residential rental units).
C.

Are Guarantors Protected Under Montana's Anti-Deficiency
Statute?

1. Guarantors and the One Action and the No Further Action
Rules
Montana's judicial foreclosure scheme does not address
whether a party to a continuing guaranty with the foreclosing creditor can seek refuge in substantive protection of the Chunkapura
decision, the purchase money mortgage statute, or the one action
rule. 23 ' No Montana law or statutory language directly prohibits a
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1988).
OR. REV. STAT. § 88.075 (1987).
228. Statutory definition of whether the statute applies to contracts for deed or the
judicial deed of trust foreclosures could eliminate unnecessary litigation.
229. Whether the legislature desires to promote seller financing on certain uses of
property governs whether the statute should apply to all kinds of security devices. "To deny
such vendor-mortgagees deficiency judgment in the event of a foreclosure may deter the use
of socially useful financing." NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 605.
230. "Most homeowners are not highly knowledgeable and are generally unable to appreciate, to the same degree as a commercial investor, the financial risk associated with
property ownership." Platt, Deficiency Judgments in Oregon Loans Secured by Land:
Growing Disparity Among FunctionalEquivalents, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 37, 55 (1987).
231. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-222, -232 (1987); Chunkapura, - Mont. -, 734
P.2d 1203.
226.
227.
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direct action against a guarantor for a deficiency judgment after
the judicial foreclosure of a mortgage. Cases in other jurisdictions
addressing the issue turn on the specific language of the particular
anti-deficiency statute involved.2 32 However, "there is clear[ly] ...
a judicial predisposition to deny guarantors the protections of antideficiency legislation. ' 233 The rationale of one jurisdiction having a
one action rule illustrates why deficiency protection can be denied
to the guarantor if the creditor gives adequate notice of the sale:
The measure of the guarantor's liability is determined by his own
contract of guaranty. If the primary debt is secured, we discern
no impediment to a guaranty providing for liability only to the
extent that a deficiency judgment would be obtainable against the
primary debtor. The most obvious protection for the guarantor
would be to attend the foreclosure sale of the security and bid up
the price to its fair market value: by that means he would insure
that his liability under the contract of guarantee would be precisely coextensive with the potential liability with the primary
debtor under the anti-deficiency statute.234
Thus, in Nevada no direct prohibition against taking a deficiency judgment against a guarantor exists if two conditions are
met. First, an independent contract of guarantee must exist between the lender and guarantor, which is not dependent on the
promissory note between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 3 5 Second, the guarantor must obtain adequate notice of the foreclosure
sale so as to "bid up" the price to its fair value.23 6 Montana's one
action rule should be amended to contain these requirements to
clearly define a guarantor's post-sale liability.
Montana's purchase money mortgage statute does not prohibit
a deficiency judgment against the guarantor of the mortgagor's obligation.2 37 However, if the mortgagor is actually the guarantor and
the creditor has attempted to obviate the restrictions of the
purchase money mortgage statute by using a "dummy mortgagor,"
then case law applying anti-deficiency protections similar to Mon232. Annotation, Mortgages: Effect Upon Obligation of Guarantor or Surety of Statute Forbiddingor Restricting Deficiency Judgments, 49 A.L.R.3d 554 (1973). See also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 606.
233. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 606.
234. Thomas v. Valley Bank, 97 Nev. 320, 323, 629 P.2d 1205, 1207 (1981).
235. If the guarantor is actually a cosigner of the note, the effect of the foreclosure
judgment merges the note into the judgment and exonerates the note, thus reclosing the comaker. Lepper v. Jackson, 102 Mont. 259, 57 P.2d 768 (1936). However, a guarantor's obligation is not exonerated by the discharge of the principal obligor without the intervention or
omission by the creditor. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-11-214 (1987).
236. Thomas, 97 Nev. at 323, 629 P.2d at 1207.
237. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 (1987).
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tana's purchase money mortgage statute would prohibit a deficiency judgment.2 3 8
A guarantor's liability after a judicial foreclosure of a residen239
tial deed of trust, however, remains unclear after Chunkapura.
Chunkapura expanded the no further action statute to immunize
the debtor from deficiency exposure.2" 0 Arguably, then, the other
protections of the statute also apply to the judicial foreclosure of a
residential deed of trust. The no further action statute specifically
prohibits any action against the borrower's surety or guarantor.241
While the no further action statute clearly prohibits any judgment
against the guarantor after a non-judicial foreclosure, 4 2 its effect
on a judicial foreclosure of an occupied, residential deed of trust or
a commercial deed of trust remains uncertain. 4 3 One solution
sanctioned by other jurisdictions with anti-deficiency legislation
involves including a waiver in the contract between the guarantor
and creditor as executed by the guarantor, eliminating any antideficiency rights between the guarantor and the creditor.24 4 Montana's no further action statute should be amended to reflect
whether such a waiver would effectively permit a creditor to obtain
judgment against the guarantor.
After a non-judicial foreclosure, the no further action statute
prohibits any deficiency against the guarantor "on the note, bond,
or other obligation secured by the trust indenture or against any
other person obligated on such note, bond, or other obligation."2 4 5
It is not clear whether the statute prohibits a direct action against
the guarantor if an independent contract of guarantee exists between the creditor and the guarantor. The statute should be
amended to clarify whether a creditor can pursue the guarantor
after the nonjudicial sale.
VII.

REGULATION OF PRICE ADEQUACY

Apart from these procedural and the substantive anti-defi238. In re Wilkin Maxfield Mgmt. Co., 117 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1941); Riddle v. Lushing,
203 Cal. App. 2d 831, 21 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1962).
239. Chunkapura applied the non-judicial no further action rule to a judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust.
240. Chunkapura, - Mont. at -, 734 P.2d at 1206.
241. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1987).
242. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1987).
243. Arguably, the Chunkapura court based its decision on only the anti-deficiency
protections of section 71-1-317 of the Montana Code Annotated rather than the other broad
language of that statute.
244. Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 774, 663 P.2d 653, 655 (1983).
245. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1987).
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ciency protections, Montana law also attempts to limit the debtor's
deficiency exposure by regulating bid price adequacy at public
sales of mortgaged properties. Historically, this regulation developed in response to the "strict foreclosure" problem. The mortgagee would obtain possession of the land in exchange for the defaulted loan, thus causing a forfeiture of any equity the debtor
then had in the property, assuming the value of the land exceeded
the amount of the debt.2 48 In areas of appreciating land value, increasing the means for competitive bidding and payment to the
debtor of any surplus amounts received on the creditor's profitable
resale of the property to the debtor after the sale have been proposed to protect the debtor's equity in a property.2
Montana's
current problem, however, is that the state has experienced a "depression of sorts" since 1981, depressing land values.2
Consequently, the need for price adequacy at the public sale is even
more critical to protect the debtor from loss of the property and
exposure to a deficiency judgment.
VIII.

MONTANA'S LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO PRICE

INADEQUACY

The court in Chunkapura observed that other states have fair
market value statutes protecting the debtor against falling land
values, noting that Montana has no such legislation.24 9 Any examination of the need for fair market value legislation in Montana requires an initial analysis of existing judicial and statutory protections against sale price inadequacy.
A.

Inadequate Sale Price

The Montana Supreme Court, as numerous other jurisdictions,
has recognized its inherent equitable power to overturn a grossly
inadequate public sale price:
Mere inadequacy of price, not attended by circumstances of
fraud, misconduct, accident, mistake, or surprise tending to influence the result, is not sufficient to invalidate such a sale. Otherwise, the mere lack of competitive bids, or the intervening of any
like circumstance whereby the price realized should be deemed
inadequate, would be sufficient to render questionable the title
obtained by sale under execution [citing cases]. This rule obtains
246.
247.
248.
249.

See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 889.
Chunkapura, Mont. at __,
734 P.2d at 1208.
Id.
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generally with reference to judicial sales, as well as to sales under
execution, and is applied more rigorously in those states in which
the right of redemption exists. A gross inadequacy of price is
competent, so far as it goes, to establish fraud; but it is not in
itself, in the absence of other circumstances tending to show
fraudulent behavior on the part of the sheriff or the plaintiff in
the writ, enough to warrant the presumption that the sale was
fraudulent."'
The court's unwillingness to set aside the sale for "mere inadequacy" of sale price was based on policy grounds. If a slight price
inadequacy justified voiding the sale, the same would discourage
the number of bidders, thus hampering competitive bidding.2 5 1
The judicial "mere inadequacy" rule has been extensively criticized as providing no predictable standard of protection for the
debtor; each case depends on its individual facts.2 52 The rule also
provides no stated objective standard of protection in the event of
a disparity between price and value.2 53 Furthermore, the dearth of
modern case law in Montana makes it impossible to predict the
circumstances under which the court might apply the gross inadequacy rule.2 5 Other criticism centers on the highly subjective nature of the "shock the conscience" standard necessary to trigger a
court ordered resale2 55 and the unstructured nature of evidence admissible to establish the true value of the property.2 5
B.

Montana's Redemption Statutes

Montana's statutory right of redemption provides a more indirect source of regulating price adequacy.2 57 More than half of the
states authorize a statutory right of redemption providing additional time for the mortgagor, its successor in interest, or, in many
instances junior lienholders, to pay a certain sum of money, usually
the foreclosure sale price, to redeem the title to the property.2 5
Montana's one year right of redemption is applicable to any property sold under the traditional mortgage, or presumably, upon ju250. Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275, 286, 76 P. 563, 565 (1904).
251. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 So. CAL. L. REv. 843, 860 (1980).
252. Id. at 861.
253. Id.
254. Platt, supra note 230, at 45. Platt makes the same argument regarding the rule in
Oregon.
255. Washburn, supra note 251, at 866.
256. Id. at 867.
257. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-13-801 through -825 (1987). See also infra notes 281-87
and accompanying text.
258. NIELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 616.
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dicial foreclosure of a commercial deed of trust. 5 9 In Chunkapura,
the Montana Supreme Court eliminated any redemption right after the judicial foreclosure of an occupied, single-family residential
deed of trust. 6 ' The statutory right of redemption differs from the
equity of redemption.2 6 ' The mortgagor loses the latter after the
mortgagee elects to accelerate the entire amount of the mortgage
upon default by the mortgagor and obtains a decree of foreclosure. 262 The statutory right of redemption continues for one year
after the sheriff's sale and applies in Montana to the traditional
mortgage, a mortgage sold under the power of sale, and a commercial deed of trust foreclosed judicially.
In the non-judicial context, the grantor-mortgagor cannot redeem the property after a trustee sale of the deed of trust property. 6 3 This forms a part of the quid pro quo between the creditor
and the borrower: the creditor gives up the right to pursue the deficiency judgment and the borrower sacrifices the right of redemption.26 4 The debtor's virtually unlimited equity of redemption
before the trustee's sale supplies another rationale for the elimination of the debtor's right of redemption in the non-judicial context:
the debtor can escape acceleration of the debt by payment of ar2 65
rears up to the trustee's sale.
In the judicial context, the debtor who personally occupies the
property has the right to remain in possession during the redemption period. ' Additionally, temporary Montana moratorium law
creates a right of first refusal in the event of a sale or lease of the
foreclosed property for the immediately preceding owner. 67
Redemption is available to the judgment debtor, his spouse or
his successor in interest, or if the debtor is a corporation, to the
corporation or a stockholder. 2 8 Redemption is also available to any
creditor having a lien by judgment, mortgage, or attachment subse259. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-13-801 through -825 (1987); Chunkapura, - Mont. at
734 P.2d at 1205.
260. Chunkapura, - Mont. at __,
734 P.2d at 1210-11.
261. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
262. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.6, at 489; Dipple v. Neville, 82 Mont. 280,
286, 267 P. 214, 218 (1928).
263. The purchaser at the trustee's sale obtains the title of the trustee free of any
redemption right. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-318 (1987). The purchaser can obtain possession
within ten days after the sale. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-319 (1987).
264. Chunkapura, - Mont. at __,
734 P.2d at 1210.
265. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-312 (1987).
266. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-821 (1987).
267. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-902 (1987). This moratorium law terminates June 30,
1996.
268. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-801(1)(a) (1987).
__
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quent to the encumbrance foreclosed.2 6 At any time within one
year after the sale, the redemptioner can reacquire the property by
tendering the equivalent of the purchase price plus six percent per
annum interest on the purchase price, and assessments and taxes
paid by the purchaser, plus interest thereon.2 7 Montana does not
permit the creditor to include other advances such as management
fees incurred during the redemption period in the redemption
amount. 7 1 Montana law prohibits waiver of this statutory right of
redemption prior to the foreclosure sale.2 72 This prohibition also
applies in the federal context to a Small Business Administration
or Farmers Home Administration loan mortgage.2 73 The effect of
redemption by the judgment debtor restores the debtor "to his
[previous] estate," thus reviving any liens on the property junior to
the lien foreclosed2 74 and causing a deficiency judgment obtained
against the debtor to attach to the foreclosed property upon the
debtor's redemption.2 7 5
Most notably, statutory redemption gives the debtor a second
chance to repurchase the property for the amount bid at the
sale. 27' Theoretically, the redemption period allows the debtor time
to rehabilitate his financial affairs and obtain financing for the repurchase of his home at the sale price. In practice, however, this
"second chance" aspect of the redemption statute is rarely exercised due to the borrower's inability to obtain new financing. 7
Data gathered from other states shows that mortgagors rarely redeem from a foreclosure sale.27 Studies in two counties in Iowa
between 1881 and 1980 showed decennial incidences of redemption
ranging from 3.9 percent to 25 percent.2 79 Studies in the Oregon
counties of Clackamas, Marion, and Multnomah between 1970 and
1980 showed a decennial incidence of redemption of 9.8 percent.28 0
269. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-801(1)(b) (1987).
270. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-802 (1987).
271. Lester v. J. & S. Investment Co., 171 Mont. 149, 153, 557 P.2d 299, 301 (1976).
272. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-229 (1987).
273. United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pastos,
781 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986).
274. Dipple v. Neville, 82 Mont. 280, 287, 267 P. 214, 219 (1928).
275. McQueeney v. Toomey, 36 Mont. 282, 296, 92 P. 561, 565 (1907).
276. Platt, supra note 230, at 48.
277. Id. See also Washburn, supra note 251, at 931.
278. See Washburn, supra note 251, at 930-31 ("If the property is worth more than
the sale price, it is theoretically possible for the mortgagor to secure financing to redeem the
property.").
279. Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered; The Operation of Iowa's Redemption Statute in Two Counties Between 1881 and 1980, 70 IOWA L. REv. 343, 386-89 (1985).
280. Comment, Oregon Statutory Right of Redemption-Any Redeeming Qualities?,
16 WILLAMETTE L.J. 891, 915 (1980).
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Further, the incidence of redemption from foreclosure sales in
Washington between 1956 and 1960 was 1.1 percent.2 8 1
More importantly, statutory redemption deters deliberate underbidding by the sale purchaser because a redemptioner need
only pay the sale price, plus taxes, assessments, and 6 percent per
annum interest.2 8 ' The purchaser-creditor has therefore no incentive to bid the property below the amount of the debt owed. Otherwise, the creditor risks losing its lien to the redeeming debtor, or a
redemptioner who has purchased the debtor's redemption rights, 8' 3
or a junior lien creditor entitled to redeem the property. 8' 4 In such
event, the original purchaser-creditor becomes an unsecured creditor as to the amount of its bid not paid by the redemptioner who
acquired its right through the debtor.2 85
The folklore of redemption theory only emphasizes the fact
that a deficiency judgment will immediately attach to the debtor's
property if the debtor redeems. 2 8 1 However, studies show that the
debtor rarely redeems anyway and that lenders rarely pursue deficiency judgments.2 8 Because the debtor's redemption right is a
saleable commodity, the central thrust of the redemption statute
in the commercial context insures that the purchaser-creditor bids
no less than the amount owed. If the creditor bids any less, a second lienholder may obtain the property through the debtor at a
windfall and render the purchaser-creditor unsecured as to the balance of the debt owed.
Although the redemption statute forces the creditor-purchaser
to bid no less than the debt owed, the redemption right renders
the title acquired by the sale purchaser defeasible and discourages
281. Shattack, Security Transactions,36 WASH. L. REV. 303, 311 n.3 (1961).
282. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-802 (1987); Washburn, supra note 251, at 931.
283. See Brown v. Timmins, 79 Mont. 246, 256 P. 176 (1927); Baker v. Pennsylvania
Fire Ins. Co., 81 Mont. 271, 263 P. 93 (1928).
284. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-801 (1987).
285. The redemptioner acquiring its right through the debtor need only pay the purchaser-creditor the amount of the bid price, plus 6 percent statutory interest and limited
costs and assessments. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-802 (1987); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 51
Mont. 509, 154 P. 717 (1916). The balance of the debt owed to the creditor, if the debtor or
his assigns redeems, is not secured by any lien. If the redemptioner does not acquire its
right through the debtor, it must pay the senior lien holder's lien amount plus interest, etc..
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-803 (1987).
286. Chunkapura,
Mont. at __,
734 P.2d at 1205.
287. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 878. In the New York data gathered by Wechsler only
one of ninety-four foreclosure sales resulted in a deficiency, and in that case the judgment
was unsatisfied. Wechsler also notes that lenders rarely pursue deficiency judgments in the
residential context because the debtor is in extremis already. Id. at 895-96. The rationale,
however, does not apply in the commercial context.
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competitive bidding at the sale, thus depressing the sale price.18 8
Redemption schemes also increase the cost of credit by increasing
interest rates charged and reducing loan value ratios (thus increasing down payments). 8 9 In an exhaustive study of the costs of judicial foreclosure and statutory redemption in Iowa, the author candidly states, "admittedly, the empirical evidence that presently is
available falls far short of demonstrating judicial foreclosure and
statutory redemption produce such a profusion of benefits that
those states in which they presently do not exist should embrace
them."2 90 The author also demonstrates that a radical difference
exists in the average cost of uncontested non-judicial foreclosures
and the average cost of uncontested judicial foreclosures, 29 1 reflected in terms of increased interest rates and down payments to
the prospective borrower. 2
Applied to Montana, the credit costs of judicial foreclosure
and redemption are substantial enough to warrant legislative inquiry as to whether these costs outweigh the redemption statute's
effect on deterring deliberate underbidding in commercial and residential contexts. Eliminating the right of redemption for the judicial foreclosure of the residential deed of trust (as in Chunkapura)
may reduce credit costs. However, the countervailing increase in
credit costs caused by Chunkapura's elimination of the deficiency
judgment renders the net effect of the decision uncertain.

IX.

FAIR MARKET VALUE-Is IT NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF
MONTANA'S REDEMPTION STATUTE?

A.

Fair Market Value

The court in Chunkapura urged the Montana Legislature to
consider the enactment of fair market value legislation, sending
copies of the decision to the speaker of the house of the 1987 Montana Legislature.2 93 The need for such legislation must be assessed
in light of Montana's redemption statute and other substantive
Montana anti-deficiency law.
288. Washburn, supra note 251, at 854 n.57 and accompanying text.
289. Bauer, supra note 279, at 376-81; Comment, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 413 (1968).
290. Bauer, supra note 279, at 375.
291. Id. at 378-79.
292. Id. at 351 n.35, where Bauer concludes that in the final analysis "[tihe actual
effects of judicial foreclosure and statutory redemption ... are some reduction in the size of
mortgage loans, some increase in mortgage loans interest rates, or a combination of the
two."
Mont. at -_,734 P.2d at 1209.
293. Chunkapura,
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Legislatures enact fair market value legislation primarily in response to falling land values when forced sales bring only nominal
sale prices, resulting in increased deficiency exposure to the
debtor.29 4 Instead of focusing on measures aimed at insuring an adequate sale price, the fair market value statutes abandon the foreclosure sale price obtained as the test for the deficiency. 9 5 Fair
market value statutes limit the deficiency to an established value
rather than by a percentage of value as under "upset" appraisal
statutes.2 96 Courts determine valuation through testimony, often
witnesses for the parties, although some statutes authorize court
appointed appraisers.2 9 "Seventeen states have [fair market] value
legislation providing that the amount of the deficiency judgment
must be based on the greater of statutorily determined fair market
value or sale price."2' 9 Procedurally, in most states "the evidentiary hearing occurs upon the creditor's deficiency complaint,
which sets forth the creditor's allegation of the fair value."2'9 9 The
debtor must then introduce evidence of fair value. The Idaho Code
provides an example of such a statute placing the burden on the
creditor:
No court in the State of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a
deficiency judgment in any case involving a foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in any amount greater than the difference
between the mortgage indebtedness, as determined by the decree,
plus costs of foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable value of the
mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the decree
upon the taking of evidence of such value."'
Idaho also applies the fair market value statute to a judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust.30 1 Nevada's statute provides a more for3 02
mal procedure.
The Idaho and Nevada statutes fail to protect the mortgagee
294. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 601-02.
295. Id.
296. Washburn, supra note 251, at 907-08.
297. Id. at 908.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 909.
300. IDAHO CODE § 6-108 (1987).
301. IDAHO CODE § 45-1512 (1987).
302. NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.455 (1987) applies to both judicial and non-judicial sales.
Under the Nevada statute, within three months after the sale, upon fifteen days' notice, the
party requesting the deficiency must request a fair market value hearing. Either party can
present evidence. Ten days prior to the hearing the court or either party can request a court
appointed appraiser to impartially appraise the property, and this appraisal is admissible
evidence of value of the property. The amount of the deficiency is the lesser of the debt
minus the fair market value or sale price.
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when a third-party purchaser purchases the property at the sale.
The mortgagee must credit the higher fair market value rather
than the presumptively lower sale price against the debt. Thus, if
not the purchaser, the mortgagee does not receive the economic
equivalent of the difference between the fair market value and the
sale price. Commentators frequently criticize this aspect of fair
market value statutes. 3 South Dakota addresses the problem by
limiting application of the fair market value statute to sales in
which the mortgagee is the successful bidder. 0
If the fair market value is less than the judgment amount,
under the South Dakota statute the mortgagee has the burden of
proving that its bid equals the fair market value.3 0 5 The court then
credits either the fair market value or sale price, whichever is
greater, against the debt for the purpose of determining the defito prove
ciency. Other statutes place this burden on the debtor
3 06
amount.
bid
the
exceeds
value
that the fair market
For obvious reasons, a fair market value statute based on existing market values achieves its objective only when fair market
valuation occurs at or near the time of the judicial sale. Accordingly, most such statutes require that the valuation occur within a
short time following the sale, typically no more than ninety days.3 0
Yet by their use of intrinsic or future valuation, certain fair market
value statutes in depressed periods yield values higher than the
market price because judicial sales during an economic depression
reflect prices equal to actual market values.3 08 Courts thus entertain a policy-based fiction that a value credit is the best possible
solution to price inadequacy when values are generally
depressed. 0 9
303.

NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 602; Washburn, supra note 251, at

911.
304. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-47-15 through -16; 21-48-13 through -14 (1988).
305. Washburn, supra note 251, at 912.
306. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3280 (West 1968); Washburn, supra note
251, at 912.
307. Washburn, supra note 251, at 913.
308. Washburn, supra note 251, at 913-14, noting:
If the property brings a low foreclosure sale price as a result of a general or local
economic depression, a market value determination will yield a correspondingly
depressed amount. The statutory fair market value in depressed periods may be
somewhat higher than the sale price, since judicial sales do not yield prices equal
to current market values. A valuation in the same market environment, however,
will often simply confirm the depressed sales price and will not yield an amount
equal to the intrinsic or future value of the property.
Id.
309. Id. at 914. See also Skilton, Assessing the Mortgage Debtor's PersonalLiability,
90 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 451-52 (1942).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol49/iss2/5

40

ial Foreclosure Sale: Analysis and Suggestions for ReformThe Montana Judicial and Non-judicial Foreclosu

19881

MONTANA FORECLOSURE SALES

325

Montana does not need fair market value protections. After
foreclosure of a two-party purchase money mortgage or a judicial
foreclosure of an occupied, single-family residential deed of trust,
the debtor has no deficiency exposure under either such foreclosure.3 10 Chunkapura'sinvitation to the Montana Legislature to enact fair market value legislation therefore seems enigmatic. However, a Montana residential and commercial non-purchase money
mortgage debtor still faces deficiency exposure, as does a borrower
under a commercial deed of trust.1 ' If the legislature enacts fair
market value legislation to limit deficiency exposure under the
commercial deed of trust or mortgage, this may unwisely increase
the cost of credit by increasing interest rates and reducing loan to
value ratios. 12 When the value of real property collateral is, or
may be, insufficient to cover the loan, the lender often relies on the
commercial developer's individual net worth and the possibility of
recourse to additional personal property or collateral security.
Limiting the creditor's recourse to the difference between the
higher of the sale price bid or the fair market value on the remaining amount of debt ignores Montana's redemption scheme which
already protects the Montana commercial deed of trust or mortgage debtor to the extent that the real value of the property exceeds the amount bid at the sheriff's sale. Thus, Montana's redemption statute already adequately protects the commercial
borrower. As a policy matter, full deficiency exposure does not unfairly disadvantage the commercial borrower since commercial borrowers typically understand the risk involved with real property
ownership in times of fluctuating property values. 1 3
X.

A.

MEANS OF IMPROVING PRICES PAID AT DISTRESS SALES

Judicial and Non-Judicial Sales of Distressed Property

1. Overview of the Notice of Sale Procedures for Sheriff's and
Trustee Sales in Montana
Montana's judicial foreclosure scheme requires compliance
310. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 (1987); Chunkapura, - Mont. at -,
734 P.2d
at 1210.
311. Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 (1987).
312. Commercial deeds of trust would not be as salable on the secondary mortgage
market with fair market legislation governing their foreclosure since that may delay the
lender from acquiring free title. See generally Congressional Findings for the Proposed
Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act H.R. 10688 and S. 2507, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
Comment, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TRUST J. 413 (1968).
313. Platt, supra note 230, at 55.
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with the general provisions of Montana's execution of judgment
statutes.14 After the court has entered the foreclosure decree, the
creditor must post a notice, as prescribed by statute, for twenty
days in three public places of the township or city where the property is situated and where the property is sold.3 15 The creditor
must also publish the notice once a week for twenty days in "some
newspaper published in the county, if there be one ...."I"
Montana's non-judicial foreclosure scheme contains substantially stricter notice requirements than Montana's judicial scheme.
The debtor and all persons having a lien or interest of record subsequent to the interest of the debtor and all other persons must be
given 120 days' notice by certified mail.31 Additionally, the creditor must publish the notice of sale at least forty-one days prior to
the sale in a newspaper of general circulation where the property is
located,18 or must post the property with the recorded notice of
sale at least twenty days before the sale date. 1 9
2.

ConstitutionalNotice Requirements

If the creditor fails to comply with any of these notice requirements, he has arguably violated "notice" protections under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 ° Additionally, if the
debtor never receives notice of his right to contest the existence of
a default at any time in the non-judicial foreclosure proceeding,
the creditor risks violating the requirement under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment that the debtor be given the
opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of a significant
property interest. 2 1
314. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-13-701 through -714 (1987).
315. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-701(1)(c) (1987).
316. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-701(1)(c) (1987).
317. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(1)(a) (1987).
318. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(1)(c) (1987). The statute requires the last publication to be made at least twenty days before the date fixed for the trustee's sale. The publication must occur once a week for three consecutive weeks. First publication is, therefore,
forty-one days prior to sale.
319. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(1)(b) (1987).
320. See, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.24 at 562-64, and Mennonite Bd. of
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795 (1983) (where the Court emphasized that constructive
notice alone does not satisfy the requirement that the type of notice used must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
321. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.25, at 566-69 (citing Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 339 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), reh'g denied, 409
U.S. 902 (1972)).
In Montana, the creditor usually gives the debtor written notice of his right to contest
the existence of a default in the initial notice of default that precedes the commencement of
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3. Debtor's Right to Direct the Sale
At the sale, the judgment debtor can direct the order in which
the real or personal property is to be sold and can require separate
sales of known lots or parcels if this generates a higher sale
price.2 2 The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted this statute
to allow a debtor to compel the creditor to sell commercial property before residential property.3 2 3 If the foreclosure decree specifies that the property must be sold en masse and the debtor fails
on the record to establish the prejudicial effect of such a sale
method, there is no error in permitting the property to be sold en
masse as described in the mortgage.2 ' If the foreclosure decree
does not specify the manner of the sale of the property, the statutory provisions giving the debtor the right to direct the sale would
control the transaction.32 5 Because there is no decree otherwise directing the sale of the property in the non-judicial context, the
trustee determines how to sell the property; however, upon reasonable notice to the trustee, the debtor can direct the order of the
sale. 2
Both the judicial and non-judicial statutory schemes require
that the property be sold to the highest bidder.32 7 However, only
the non-judicial scheme explicitly requires "cash. '328 The judicial
scheme contains no cash requirement, but Montana does require
sheriff's sales of personal property to be done in cash. 2 9
XI.

CRITICISMS OF MONTANA'S NOTICE AND SALE REQUIREMENT

A.

Criticism of the "Cash Only" Requirement

The creditor at the judicial and non-judicial sale has a distinct
advantage over other bidders because he can receive a credit
the non-judicial foreclosure by thirty days. Even if this notice is not given, some courts hold
that the debtor's right to enjoin the foreclosure process by suit comports with the "opportunity for a hearing" requirements. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 7.25, at 569 (citing
Laughlin v. Walters, 718 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1983); Fitzgerald v. Cleland, 650 F.2d 360 (1st
Cir. 1987); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970). But see Turner v. Blackburn,
389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp.
594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975)).
322. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-704 (1987).
323. First Nat'l Bank v. Powell, Mont ...
689 P.2d 255, 257 (1984).
324. Elston v. Hix, 67 Mont. 294, 298-300, 215 P. 657, 659 (1923); Thomas v. Thomas,
44 Mont. 102, 119 P. 283 (1911).
325. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-704 (1987).
326. Powell, __
Mont. at __,
689 P.2d at 255.
327. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-315(4), 25-13-704 (1987).
328. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(4) (1987).
329. Proto v. Missoula County,
- Mont.
,
P.2d , 45 St. Rptr. 265
(1988).
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against the judgment amount for his bid (an "exchange of credits")
instead of a cash payment.33 0 This advantage, it is argued, discourages competitive bidding by third-party bidders at the sale and
suppresses actual sale prices. 3 1
B.

Criticisms of the Advertising Requirements

Judicial and non-judicial foreclosures usually result in advertising in the legal column of local newspapers, posting of notice on
the property and posting of notice at the courthouse. These kinds
of notice devices have been criticized as not conveying notice of the
sale to the general real estate market. 3 2 As a result of failing to
apprise the public of the impending foreclosure sale, only a limited
group of speculators or investors who are interested in buying the
property at low prices attend the sale. 333 Because similar notice
and sale provisions in other jurisdictions constitute a major cause
of price inadequacy in foreclosure sales, these defects in both Montana's judicial and non-judicial foreclosure notice requirements
present a serious problem."'
In Montana, under both the judicial and non-judicial foreclosure scheme, the creditor engages a local newspaper to print the
sale notice in the paper's legal section. However, as shown above,
printed legal advertisements buried in the newspaper do not attract the general public. Additionally, the absence of necessary descriptive information fails to inspire further inquiry by the general
public.
XII.

A.

PROPOSED REFORMS

Commercial Advertising and Plain Language

The Uniform Land Transactions Act 335 provides a starting
330. Washburn, supra note 251, at 849 (citing inter alia Barnard v. First Nat'l Bank,
176 Okla. 326, 328, 55 P.2d 972, 974 (1936).
331. Washburn, supra note 251, at 849.
332. See, NELSON, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosures in Missouri:
Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151, 152 (1982); Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. C. L. REV. 575 (1937).
333. Washburn, supra note 251, at 848 (citing, inter alia, Fairchild, ForeclosureMethods and Costs: A Reevaluation, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 4 (1937); Durfee & Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-the Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. REV. 825 (1925)).

334. See, Washburn, supra note 251, at 896. See also, Durfee and Doddridge, supra
note 333, at 832; Tefft, supra note 333, at 589-90.
335. Although not adopted by any state due to its monumental objective of unifying
state foreclosure law, the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA) (1975 original text) provides helpful proposals because its overall assumption is that both the creditor's and
debtor's interests are best served when the property commands the best price on disposi-
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point for revisions to Montana's judicial notice and sale provisions.3 3 6 The Act requires the creditor to use the method that is
"reasonable under the circumstances" and contemplates the use of
a real estate agent or real estate advertisement to reach the
broadest possible class of potential third-party bidders."3 7 Mere
advertisement in a legal publication does not meet that section's
requirements of "commercial reasonableness."' 338 The breadth of
the standard forces the mortgagee to make an affirmative effort to
offer the type of property sold to known markets in the real estate
community involved, resulting in increased exposure and salability.
Increased advertisement also broadens the group of potential bidders who may become aware of the sale. Data showing that advertisement in the legal section of the newspaper does not attract the
general public makes this aspect of the Act compelling. 3 9
In addition to the method of advertising, the content of the
foreclosure notice should be clarified. Elimination of esoteric legal
descriptions and legalese in favor of "normal, commercial descriptive, and pictorial advertising" could better attract the public.3 40
Additional information should include a description of the use of
the real estate, the street address, the zoning designation, and
available financing terms, if any. Such information would permit a
potential bidder to inspect the property, possibly triggering increased bidding at the sale.
B.

Increasing Time for Financing

Increasing the time between the first public notice and the
sale date of the foreclosed property could facilitate financing for
potential third-party bidders.34 1 The time given to the public to
obtain financing under Montana's judicial scheme can be as short
as twenty days,34 1 while under the non-judicial scheme the initial
publication can occur as close as forty-one days to the date of
sale. 3 These first notice dates should be extended back to enable
tion. ULTA § 3-505, comment 1 (1975).
336. ULTA § 3-508(a) (1975).
337. ULTA § 3-508(a) (1975).
338. ULTA § 3-508(a) (1975).
339. Nelson, supra note 332, at 163. Washburn, supra note 251, at 896; Wechsler,
supra note 3, at 891.
340. Nelson, supra note 332, at 163.
341. Financing approval can take as long as two months at certain lending institutions.
Increasing the first notice period to comply with the realities of time in commercial loan
approval time frames could result in increased competitive bidding.
342. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-701 (1987).
343. MONT.CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(1)(c) (1987).
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an interested third-party bidder adequate time to obtain financing.
C.

Down Payment at the Sale

The requirement that the third-party bidder pay cash at the
sale chills competitive bidding, especially in light of the mortgagee's ability to exchange credits and avoid cash outlay at the
sale.3 44 To compensate for this disadvantage, the Uniform Land
Transactions Act permits the third-party bidder to pay with a
"bank obligation" or to deposit 10 percent of the bid price in cash
and pay the remaining balance within five weeks. 4 5 If the bidder
fails to make the deposit or complete the sale, the seller may resell
the property or bring an action for specific performance.3 4, Montana allows the sheriff to recover only the amount occasioned by
the loss on resale to the second bidder, 4 7 but does not afford any
flexibility in financing or specific performance remedies. The flexible ULTA provision promotes competitive bidding; Montana's judicial and non-judicial sales statutes should be amended
accordingly.
D.

Court Confirmation

Montana does not require court confirmation of the judicial
and non-judicial sale price. 4 The ULTA requires post-sale court
confirmation insuring that creditors comply with the Act's notice
and sale provisions.3 4 ' The person conducting the sale must report
3 50
to the court, which confirms the sale if "justice has been done. 1
The ULTA does not contain any fair market value standard for
confirmation, but leaves the decision to the court's discretion on a
3 51
case-by-case basis.
Although Montana does not require judicial confirmation, the
court in Chunkapura urged the Montana Legislature to enact fair
market value legislation that is in effect a type of confirmation. 52
Assuming that some kind of confirmation legislation is necessary,353 the ULTA court confirmation standard is more realistic be344.
345.
346.

Washburn, supra note 251, at 849.
ULTA § 3-508(b) (1975).
ULTA § 3-508(b) (1975).
347. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-705 (1987).
348. Interior Sec. Co. v. Campbell, 55 Mont. 459, 466, 178 P. 582, 584 (1919).
349. ULTA § 3-509 (1975).
350. ULTA § 3-509 (1975).
351. ULTA § 3-509 (1975).
352. Chunkapura, Mont. at -, 734 P.2d at 1209 (1982).
353. Arguably, Montana's redemption scheme for commercial properties and anti-deficiency rules already protect the debtor from deliberate underbidding by the creditor. See
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cause, unlike the inherent or intrinsic fair market value statutes, 354
the court need not make a value credit for properties that are otherwise incapable of valuation on the market. Rather, such a credit
would constitute only one of many factors the court can use to confirm the sale. Additionally, the ULTA confirmation standard permits sufficient flexibility to prevent, at the court's discretion, a
"battle of the appraisers" at the confirmation hearing.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

Ambiguity permeates Montana's judicial and non-judicial
mortgage foreclosure statutes. First State Bank v. Chunkapura
raises numerous questions regarding the judicial foreclosure of a
Montana deed of trust. Pulse v. North American Title Co. creates
numerous questions relating to Montana's purchase money mortgage statute. The call for fair market value legislation in light of
Montana's redemption scheme raises serious questions about the
need for fair market value legislation. The ambiguities governing
Montana's one action rule regarding a single obligation secured by
personal and real property serve neither the creditor or debtor.
Such ambiguity only creates the opportunity for litigation to "represent one's client" and "clarify the law" at the expense of either
the debtor or the creditor. Additionally, Montana's sheriff's sale
and trustee's sale statutes do not promote active and competitive
bidding or realistically apprise buyers of the nature of the property
subject to sale.
Any state's judicial and non-judicial mortgage foreclosure
scheme cannot reverse adverse economic trends. However, as the
historical development of mortgage foreclosure law reveals, the
broad policy of mortgage foreclosure law is to minimize deficiency
exposure to the buyer, while affording the creditor access to its collateral in partial or total satisfaction of the unpaid debt. If modernized and streamlined, Montana's mortgage foreclosure statutes
could more effectively accomplish those policies.

supra notes 293-313 and accompanying text. In any event, confirmation should be required
only if the lender seeks a deficiency judgment.
354. See supra notes 294-303 and accompanying text.
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